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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, and UN-
ION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, and STATEWIDE PLUMBING 
AND HEATING COMPANY, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
8122 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff Railroad Companies filed herein a State-
ment of Points by way of cross appeal wherein it was urged 
that the trial court erred in certain particulars. Those 
Points will be urged and argued herein. However Plaintiffs 
will be referred to herein as respondent and defendant Mur-
ray City as Appellant. 
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The statement of facts as set forth in appellant's brief 
is, with one or two minor exceptions, substantially correct, 
as far as it goes, but there are numerous facts which are 
very material and important in presenting the matter fully 
to this court which appellant did not set forth. Respond-
ent will add some of such facts here, as well as additional 
facts in connection with points of argument. 
Emphasis throughout is ours unless otherwise indicated. 
On page 4 of its brief appellant states: "A power line 
of Murray City runs down the east side of the tracks near 
the east boundary line of the street and has been there since 
1914-15." It is true there are some poles carrying a power 
line on the east side of so-called 2nd West but they do not 
run from 5300 to 6400 South. There was nowhere any testi-
mony that the power lines ran such full distance, Mayor 
Hansen merely testifying: "We have our power line on both 
sides of the street" (R. 126). The map, Exhibit P-11, made 
from actual survey and measurement of existing physical 
features (R. 56), shows a Western Union pole line on the 
east side running full distance about midway between the 
track and east fence line. The only Murray pole or power 
line on the east side extends a short distance north and south 
from 61st South Street to serve the half-dozen homes in that 
area. (See Exhibits D-10, P-11, P-37 and P-22 to P-26, in-
clusive.) 
USE OF RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY 
The fact is undisputed and indisputable that the rail-
road track was constructed during the summer of 1871 (R. 
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34, 60) . The land was then all public domain, the first 
patent in the area being dated July 10, 1872, covering prop-
erty at the north end, and the next earliest being dated De-
cember 1, 1874 (R. 37-39). There has been no change in 
the location of this railroad track since its original construc-
tion (R. 59). The property claimed by the railroad is now 
fenced on both sides (R. 109-110) and has been fenced at 
least since 1920 (Exhibits D-10, P-37) and has been return-
ed to the state tax commission for tax assessment purposes 
and taxes paid thereon to the state and Murray City at 
least since 1917 (Exhibits P-7, 8 & 9; R. 47, 50). 
In addition to building its track over the public domain, 
the railroad company secured full warranty deeds of title 
to the area claimed, except for a small strip in the north 
end of Section 24. The latter area has been claimed by the 
railroad, has been fenced and has been included in the tax 
returns to the state tax commission and taxes paid on it 
(Exhibits D-10, P-37, P-7, 8 & 9; R. 47, 50; see also County 
Plat Ex. P-6; see also Trust Deeds and Mortgages in Ex-
hibit D-32, Entries 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10). 
USE OF AREA BY PUBLIC AS ROADWAY 
There isn't a scintilla of evidence of any USE of any 
of the area as a roadway or highway prior to the issuance of 
patents from the United States Government, nor in fact 
prior to 1899 or 1900. Mayor Hansen's earliest recollection 
was about 1899, which would be when he was not over five 
years old (R. 120, 121). The witness Wahlquist's recollec-
tion did not go prior to 1903 (R. 111, 118, 163). Both of 
them said the roadway on the west side had been used as 
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long as they could remember (R. 111). This use was by 
pedestrians, horses and vehicular traffic, including carts, 
wagons and automobiles (R. 102, 109). Wahlquist used 
some roadway on the east side for two years while he was 
going to school, 1903 to 1905, but could remember nothing 
of it aside from those two years (R. 110-111). Mayor Han-
sen insisted the roadway on the east side was used longer 
but was not definite as to the nature of such use after 61st 
South was opened. 61st South was opened in 1905 (R. 106). 
This supposed roadway on the east side was in front of the 
school now located on 61st South Street and did not go all 
the way to 6400 South. "There was a road, however, al-
most up to the Cahoon and Maxfield's used by the Pioneer 
Nurseries" (R. 133). When asked as to who used it, the 
Mayor answered, "The Nursery Company did and anyone 
who come to purchase trees from the nursery" (R. 133). 
The Nursery Company owned the property to the east of 
the track and was the party who gave to Murray City the 
deed to 61st South Street (Ex. D-33; R. 139). 
There is no evidence as to when the school on 61st 
South Street was first constructed. Respondent's counsel, 
having no knowledge, refused to stipulate as to when the 
school was constructed other than to stipulate that it was 
constructed on the property deeded from James Randall 
to named school trustees (R. 103). This deed was dated 
April 7, 1875 (Ex. D-12), and Randall's patent December 
1, 1874 (R. 38, 84). It was stipulated that a Mrs. McMillan 
attended this school in 1881. Thus all that can be gained 
from the evidence is that it was constructed sometime be-
tween April 7, 1875, the date of the deed and 1881. 
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In the extreme upper left-hand corner of Exhibit P-20 
is shown the school in front of which the roadway east of 
the track was supposed to pass. This is the present school 
but built on the same location as the old one. It was re-
constructed in its present form in 1905 (R. 104). The first 
construction of the old school was a long rectangular build-
ing with the main or only door opening on the south side 
(R. 112, 113). 
The only evidence of use of so-called 2nd West upon 
which a definite conclusion could be reached or judgment 
based shows a prescriptive use of an area starting 11 feet, 
and more at various points, west of the center of the rail-
road track (see stipulation of counsel dated April 12, 1954; 
see also Ex. P-11) and even this use as a roadway has not 
extended to the west fence as claimed by Mayor Hansen be-
cause of the presence of the Murray City pole line (See Exs. 
P-17, 18, and other pictures). This use has included not 
only surface traveling and oil surfacing, but the construc-
tion of the power pole line and laying of culinary water pipes 
under the ·surface of such roadway (R. 134-136). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH RESPOND-
ENTS REQUEST REVERSAL 
1. The court erred in finding that Murray City held 
a fee title in trust for the public to the property described 
in paragraph 17 of the findings of fact (R. 215), and in 
failing to find that the railroad company held the fee title 
to said property subject to such prescriptive rights as have 
been acquired by the public therein. 
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(A) The court erred in finding, as set forth in Find-
ing of Fact No. 9 (R. 210), that the public 
used and acquired a right of way by use of said 
property while the same was still public domain. 
2. The court erred in concluding as it did in para-
graph 3 of its Conclusions of Law (R. 217), that Murray 
City had the right to lay sewer mains under the property 
described in paragraph 17 of the Findings of Fact without 
authority or permission from the plaintiffs. 
3. The court erred in its Conclusions of Law, in para-
graph 2 of its Decree (R. 222), in holding that plaintiffs 
had no right to enjoin or restrain defendants from con-
structing sewer lines under said property without permis-
sion and in denying the injunction asked by plaintiffs. 
RESTATEMENT OF POINTS SET FORTH AND 
ARGUED BY APPELLANT 
1. The court did not err in finding that the railroad 
company had the fee simple title to property described in 
paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact. 
(a) The rights of the public or of the railroad comp-
any secured by virtue of 43 U. S. C. A. 932, 
depend upon acceptance by use prior to issuance 
of patent. 
(b) Railroads may acquire a right of way under the 
act of Congress, 43 U.S. C. A. 932, and the tak-
ing of a strip of land and constructing its rail-
road thereon while still public domain was suf-
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ficient to effect such grant to the railroad 
company. 
(c) A public thoroughfare or highway under either 
43 U. S. C. A. 932, or one acquired by prescrip-
tion, is governed by actual use and reasonable 
necessity of such use as actually made. 
(d) There must be a highway shown to exist in the 
first place before there can be any necessity of 
argument re' abandonment of such highway. 
ARGUMENT 
In arguing the points involved on this appeal, respond-
ent will first refer to the points set forth by appellant and 
the argument of appellant with respect thereto. 
SUBPARAGRAPHS (a) AND (c) OF APPEL-
LANT'S POINT 1. 
Appellant's main point is that the court erred in not 
finding that the full 4-rod width was a city street. Appel-
lant would have to base such argument upon some appropri-
ation and use sufficient to create such roadway of such 
width while the property was still public domain. We will 
combine for purpose of argument appellant's paragraphs 
(a) and (c) because, if a right to a public way has been 
acquired either under the federal act or by prescription, that 
right must be shown by the actual use and will be limited 
by the use, or the reasonable necessity of the use, which 
created it. 
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At the outset, we must express surprise, if not amaze-
ment, at the amount of conjecture and the number of ifs 
and assumptions contained in appellant's brief. The argu-
ment starts with the assumption that "it seems fair" to 
say plaintiffs intended to rely on deeds to show title. Why 
then should plaintiffs go to the bother of securing an ad-
mission from defendants that the railroad was entirely con-
structed prior to the date of any patent and while the land 
was still public domain (R. 34). Appellant on page 10 of 
its brief refers to homestead laws providing for 5-year 
occupancy and says if such was the basis of the patent to the 
property in question, the street in question was occupied 
(not used) by the patentees prior to the building of the 
railroad. There is no evidence to which appellant can point 
to answer that "if", and if such was the case, must it be 
further assumed that such occupants used this so-called 2nd 
West as a street, or should we assume that they used 59th 
South or 64th South to come to State Street, the main state 
and county highway. 
Appellant says because the railroad offered no evidence 
to show there was a street, the railroad must have been 
constructed down a public highway. The mere statement 
of such shows its absurdity. The railroad company proved 
the construction of its railroad over public domain, plus the 
securing of full warranty fee title deeds, which were secured 
practically as soon as patent issued. It was appellants bur-
den to show there was a street used before patent. The ap-
pellant admitted the railroad was constructed there in 1871 
and there was no evidence of any USE of a road prior to 
about 1900. On page 11, appellant says the trustees of the 
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school "certainly believed" they were acquiring a tract of 
land abutting on a highway. How do we know they so be-
lieved? They "must have believed" 61st South Street was 
going to be opened because the front door to the school 
faced the south (R. 112-113). On page 11 appellant states 
"certainly Randall thought" there was a public road and 
"Peter Hansen would likewise have to believe" there was 
a county road there when he deeded to Myers, yet the evi-
dence is conclusive as far as the Myers deed was concerned, 
that there never was and never has been any sort of a 
roadway south of 6400 South adjoining the property cov-
ered by the Myers deed (R. 113, 134, 162). On page 12 of 
its brief appellant states that home owners "undoubtedly 
believed" they were on a highway and "it would seem 
reasonable" that if 2nd West existed only on the west side 
there would have been trouble with the railroad company 
before now. 
IN SPITE OF ALL THESE ASSUMPTIONS AND 
CONJECTURES THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHATSO-
EVER TO SUPPORT ANY OF THEM. Home owners now 
have the only ingress and egress they have ever had, which 
is that each one has a private crossing over the tracks to the 
west side of the tracks (Ex. P-11). There was "trouble 
with the railroad company" at least as far back as 1920 
(R. 136) and it has been practically continuous, to Mayor 
Hansen's own knowledge, for approximately twenty-five 
years past. 
If appellant wants to conjecture: It would "seem rea~ 
sonable" that if there were a county road in use, such road-
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way would have been mentioned in at least one of the deeds 
by at least one of the five patentees when they gave their 
deeds to the railroad company. If we must assume that both 
the railroad and the roadway were established across prop-
erty which was still public domain, couldn't we assume that 
there would have been ample room for both without, as ap-
pellant now wishes, superimposing one on the other? If 
we are to indulge further in conjecture, shouldn't we as-
sume that Peter Hansen, the Mayor's ancestor and pre-
decessor in interest, in giving trust deeds and mortgages as 
he did in Entries 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Exhibit D-32, would 
have referred to a highway or roadway rather than outlin-
ing specifically the railroad right of way, as he did, extend-
ing 33 feet on either side of the center of the track? These 
mortgages in which he so outlined the railroad right of way, 
without any reference to a roadway are dated respectively 
1876, 1878, 1880, 1884, and 1885. Surely, Peter Hansen 
with his Scandinavian astuteness would no more want to 
mortgage a county road extending across his property than 
he would a right of way which he considered the railroad 
had acquired across his property. 
If we want to further indulge in assumptions, we could 
assume that the deeds upon which appellant seems to place 
so much reliance showing courses running to a "county 
road" are merely an indication that the people in the area 
intended to open up a county road in some manner and ex-
pected it to extend south of 6400 South as referred to in 
the Myers deeds, as well as north. 
There is no escape from the admitted fact that the rail-
road was actually constructed in 1871. The only logical 
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conclusion, therefore, is that the people in the area as it 
grew began to travel along the railroad track, as was done 
in many instances in the early west, and if we want to in-
dulge in assumption, the most logical assumption would 
be that this travel along the track was not objected to by 
the railroad company and was not of great extent, at least 
until after the smelters were located in the area and the use 
of the so-called 2nd West Street no doubt received its 
greatest impetous with its use by the ore wagons which 
came west along 64th South Street and then north along 
the west side of the track to the smelters (R. 137-138). 
That is when 2nd West Street really began to be traveled 
as a roadway and that was sometime around approximately 
1900, or later. Even then it must not have been used to 
any great extent until after the extension of Murray City 
limits to include the whole area, because there appears' to 
have been a very definite change even in the official maps 
of Murray City from the time that Murray was first in-
corporated, about 1903, as shown by Exhibit D-30, to a 
time when the Murray City limits were extended in 1905, 
as shown in Exhibit D-29. 
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT 
In spite of the foregoing, we most respectfully urge 
that neither this court nor the trial court can base its 
decisions upon ifs, assumptions, conjectures, "must have 
beens", or "certainly believes." We must therefore see 
what the EVIDENCE was upon which the trial court based, 
or should have based, its findings and decision. 
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Appellant states at page 9 of its brief: "It is the posi-
tion of the City that the 4-rod street was being used by 
the public prior to the construction of the railroad and that 
the public right to the highway was acquired pursuant to 
Section 932." There is no EVIDENCE whatsoever of any 
use of any roadway prior to construction of the railroad or 
prior to issuance of patents. Liberty School was located in 
the 6100 South area to the east of the tracks sometime after 
patent. It was stipulated that a Mrs. McMillan went to 
that Liberty School in 1881, but the stipulation did not ex-
tend so far as to say what, if any, roadway she used to get 
to the school (R. 103), nor that she even lived in the Second 
West area; she may have lived somewhere east of the 
school. 
With respect to use of any area on the west side of the 
tracks, there is nothing · but conjecture to show any use 
prior to approximately 1899 (R. 120), which was the point 
of earliest recollection as far as Mayor Hansen was con-
cerned, and with respect to his recollection one of the earliest 
things that he could specifically remember was when an 
engine turned over at the smelters, which were constructed 
around 1903 (R. 122). 
Apparently the same rules apply with respect to 
acquisition of a highway under 43 U.S. C. A. 932, as where 
one is acquired by prescription. Therefore, in discussing 
this matter further, we will state that we will apply the 
same law to our argument on this point as we will later 
apply to plaintiff's contention that Murray City holds only 
a prescriptive right along the west side of the track (re-
spondent's points 1 and 1 (A)). 
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It will be interesting to refer to the two cases from this 
court cited by the appellant which have involved 43 U. S. C. 
A. 932. In Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 75 
Utah 384, 285 P. 646, the land in question did not pass from 
the United States to private owners by patent until some-
time after 1894. The evidence was "substantially uncon-
tradicted" and showed that land over which the roadway 
was located was "unenclosed and uninhabited mountain 
lands suitable only for grazing purposes." The area had 
been "extensively used for summer grazing for many years 
by owners of sheep who trailed them over the route in ques-
tion * * * ." "In 1876 a sawmill was constructed in 
Davenport Canyon and the road in question was first defin-
itely located and commenced to be used." "In about the 
year 1885" a mining camp was established in the locality 
and the road used for it. 
"During all of the time from 1876 until shortly before 
the commencement of this action the road was used by 
numerous owners of sheep * * * trailing their herds 
to and from the summer range and * * * moving their 
camps and supplies to their herds." "The use of the road for 
this purpose was general and extensive." There "must have 
been a hundred herds." One witness "had 'seen as high as 
seven herds a day' going over the road." There was no 
assumption, conjecture, or "ifs" in connection with this. 
This witness had seen the road actually thus used. One 
witness for the plaintiff testified that herds of sheep while 
trailing through occupied a space of 200 yards on each side 
of the road (a wagon roadway was admitted by both par-
ties). Others said 100 feet or more, and the trial court held 
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the road to be 100 feet in width. "There was evidence that 
more than this width had actually been used," although the 
court inferred that had only sawmills or mining been in-
volved the result might have been different. 
This court referred to cases holding that even where 
there is no formal acceptance of such a grant (under the 
federal act) , acceptance is shown by evidence of "continued 
use of the road by the public for such length of time and 
under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an intention 
on the part of the public to accept the grant." This court 
further referred to early statutes providing that "roads 
laid out and recorded as highways and * * * used 
* * * for five years, are highways." And where not 
laid out by public authority, become highways where "con-
tinually and uninterruptedly used as a public thoroughfare 
for a period of ten years." This court concluded that the 
evidence showed that the road had been used by the· public 
"from 1876 to 1894," which was prior to patent and while 
still public domain, and that this was "a time in excess of 
that required by the territorial statutes in force for creat-
ing a public highway by use." 
We accept that case as good law, but there is absolutely 
no parallel between it and the case at bar and no evidence 
here whatsoever of public use of any roadway along so-
called 2nd West while the land was public domain, nor at 
any time prior to approximately 1900. 
Counsel for appellant places some reliance upon the 
case of Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P. 2d 420, 
in his attempt to show the "reasonable necessity" that gov-
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erns the width of a road acquired by such use. In the Bert-
agnole case one witness, a William Archibald, testified to his 
personal knowledge, from his own observation, that the 
roadway in question was used "as early as 1869." 
"In addition to the evidence adduced as to the 
existence of a roadway in 1869, some thirteen wit-
nesses testified to the use of the road for vehicular 
and other traffic between 1877 and 1900 and an 
equal number as to its use since the latter date. Un-
der the laws of 1880 and 1886, quoted supra, there 
is unquestionably abundant evidence to support the 
trial court's finding or conclusion that the roadway 
was dedicated and abandoned to the use of the pub-
lic as a public highway." 
The laws of 1880 and 1886 referred to were the same 
as involved in and were set out in a quote from the Lindsay 
Livestock case, supra, with respect to roads used for five 
years after being laid out and recorded by the county re-
corder and roads otherwise deemed abandoned to the public 
by uninterrupted use for a period of ten years. In the 
Bertagnole case this court said: 
"* * * While it is true, as contended by ap-
pellant, that where dedication is established by user, 
the use to whick the way has been put measures the 
extent of the right to use, this limitation goes to the 
kind of use. The particular use having been estab-
lished, such width should be decreed by the court as 
will make such use convenient and safe. A bridle 
path abandoned to the public may not be expanded, 
by court decree, into a boulevard. On the other hand, 
the implied dedication of a roadway to automobile 
traffic is the dedication of a roadway of sufficient 
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width for safe and convenient use thereof by such 
traffic. 
"Twenty-eight witnesses were called by defend-
ants, who testified to the nature of the road and the 
use thereof which they had observed, as well as the 
use which they had themselves made of the road. 
With respect to the use thereof for herding sheep 
and cattle, William Archibald testified that he ob-
served sheep and cattle using it in the early seventies. 
He worked out poll tax on the road forty years ago. 
Use of the road by sheep made work on the road 
necessary. 
"Testimony of other witnesses was to the effect 
that at various times they drove sheep and cattle 
along the trail. Such testimony covers a period from 
the 1870's to the time of trial. * * * From the 
evidence adduced the inference is clearly a reason-
able one that the road was used for the driving of 
cattle and sheep for a number of years in excess of 
that required, whenever it was necessary or con-
venient for the members of the public who were en-
gaged in raising or herding stock to so use it." 
In the case at bar not only is there an absolute lack 
of evidence with respect to use or showing of any necessity 
for use of the 4-rod width, but the only actual use shown 
that is of sufficiently definite a nature to enable a court to 
base any conclusions thereon is the use of that portion west 
of the tracks since 1900 and as the same has since been oil-
surfaced by Murray City (See Exs. P-11 and 16 to 26, in-
clusive) . Such use as shown is sufficient to prove a pre-
scriptive right along the west side, but nothing more. 
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PRESCRIPTIVE USE 
What is the extent of this prescriptive right? On page 
17 of its brief appellant seems to assume that because the 
Peter Hansen deed to Carl F. Myer referred to a 4-rod street 
that that would be a reasonable street. Would appellant 
insist that by virtue of that deed to Myer, and nothing else, 
the railroad company could be compelled to open a 4-rod 
street over and along its tracks extending along the prop-
erty included in the Myer deed south of 64th South? On 
page 17 counsel states, referring to the entire area involved : 
"There is no evidence that there was ever a 4-
rod street on either the east or west side of the rail-
road tracks." 
With such statement we wholeheartedly agree. But 
counsel goes on to state: 
"But there is now, and has for many years been, 
a 4-rod street with the railroad tracks running down 
the center of it." 
Does the fact that counsel calls this a street make it 
one, or would the fact that counsef for respondent would 
say that that was a 4-rod railroad right of way preclude 
the appellant? The evidence conclusively shows that there 
is not now and never has been a 4-rod street with railroad 
tracks running down the center of it. There is not even a 
4-rod area enclosed between the right-of-way fences as they 
exist north of the dividing line between Sections 13 and 24. 
The only thing which shows a 4-rod street or a 4-rod right 
of way north of Section 24 is the fee title deeds to the rail-
road company. Even the fences as they are now in place, 
particularly along the west side as they extend north from 
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the north line of Section 24, do not follow along the claimec 
right-of-way line nor within the 4-rod area claimed by th~ 
railroad company (see Ex. P-11). South of the dividing lin~ 
between Section 13 and Section 24 the fences have in th1 
past and do now approximately encompass a 4-rod width. 
Counsel refers to the power lines. Does the existence 
of a power line give a right of surface travel or, indeed 
show any prior surface travel? Counsel again conjecturef 
by saying: "It seems reasonable to say that a 4-rod stree1 
would be a reasonable width," for public use. And at thE 
top of page 18 counsel goes on with further "ifs" and "as. 
sumptions." We must again state that before any width car 
be assumed there must be shown a use and the nature of thE 
use to show what width would be reasonable. The best evi· 
dence of what would be reasonable for the use actually madE 
is to look at what has actually existed for the last fifty year~ 
and what was at first covered with an oil mat, and later wiU 
a hard-surfaced oil, as now used by Murray City (R. 126), 
The use of one side of the track, with no use being made 
or having been possible of the area where the track is laid: 
would not under any law that counsel has cited, nor in om 
opinion that he could find, be sufficient to give a right tc 
use the other side of the track or to compel the moving oj 
the railroad tracks because Murray City now thought it wa~ 
necessary to widen the strip west of the tracks. If morE 
property is necessary, Murray City will have to resort tc 
proper statutory eminent domain. 
In addition to lack of use being shown, it affirmative!~ 
appears that portions of the area east of the track could no1 
have been used. There are swamp areas which had to be 
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filled on the west side but which still exist on the east side 
(R. 132-133; Exhibit P-19), including some areas wet 
enough to produce cattails (R. 131-132; Exhibit P-22). 
EFFECT OF RECITALS IN ANCIENT DEEDS 
Appellant put in evidence, over the objection of plain-
tiffs, by the testimony of the abstracter Alton Lund, cer-
tain recitals in early deeds from Peter Hansen and James 
Randall, patentees, to certain parties named in such deeds. 
There was likewise introduced in evidence, over plaintiffs' 
objection, Exhibit D-12 upon which Murray City engineer 
platted the descriptions of such deeds from Hansen and 
Randall. Ordinarily, ancient deeds or recitals therein are 
inadmissible in evidence and are considered purely as hear-
say except between the parties thereto. There is, however, 
some exception under which recitals in ancient deeds are 
admissible in evidence-"When accompanied by possession 
under the deed or other corroborating circumstances." 
(See Am. Jur., Vol. 20, Sec. 941, p. 794.) 
The rule under which such recitals are admitted in evi-
dence constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule and the 
cases which have been decided upon the subject are prac-
tically unanimous in holding that such recitals will be ad-
mitted, not to prove the existence of a certain fact not other-
wise shown, NOR the possession or occupancy of certain 
property NOR the location of a certain roadway, river or 
creek, BUT if the existence of such roadway, waterway or 
other point in issue at the time involved is first proved, or 
if actual and long-continued possession of the property in-
volved is shown, then recitals in such ancient documents will 
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be admissible to help define the limits or otherwise bolster 
the proof of location of such roadway, creek, or boundary 
line. It was for this reason that respondent's counsel ob-
jected to evidence of recitals in these deeds on the grounds, 
not only that they were hearsay and incompetent, but that 
no proper foundation had been laid to make them admissible 
(R. 77-81, 99-100). 
In the annotation following the case of Gabarino v. N oce 
(Cal.), 183 P. 532, in 6 A. L. R. 1437, reference is made to 
the admissible types of recitals in ancient deeds, and in-
cluded are the following: 
"Recitals" as to "source of title." These recitals relat-
ing to the person or persons from whom the title claimed 
by parties in the action was derived are admissible "but 
only in connection with other proof of a long continued and 
undisputed possession in accordance with the right or title 
claimed." 
"Recitals as to extent of title," "where the EXTENT of 
the property conveyed, or the location of boundary lines" 
with respect to property so conveyed, are in dispute 
"ancient deeds are properly admitted in evidence to prove 
these matters." But conveyance of the property must be 
first shown, and such ancient deeds are not admitted to 
prove the conveyance or title itself, except as they may be 
necessary as a part of the chain of title concerned in the 
lawsuit. 
"The cases are in accord in holding that recitals 
in ancient deeds are evidence of facts recited therein 
as against strangers to the title when accompanied 
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by possession under the deed or other corroborating 
circumstances." 
Wigmore, in his work on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. 
V, Sec. 1573, page 430, in discussing the question of such 
recitals, refers to the early United States case of Carver v. 
Jackson, 4 Peter 1, 83, 7 L. Ed. 761. In that case an at-
tempt was made to prove a lease. In a marriage settlement 
contract, which was designated as a deed of release, certain 
property had been set apart to third parties, and in this 
marriage settlement contract there were certain recitals 
concerning the lease, and the question was whether the re-
citals were sufficient and competent evidence of the proof 
of the lease. The United States Supreme Court held that the 
recital was not per se evidence of the lease, "but if the ex-
istence and loss of the lease be established by other evidence, 
then the recital is admissible as secondary proof in the ab-
sence of more perfect evidence, to establish the contents of 
the lease." 
Thus, the existence of such lease must be first estab-
lished, or the fact of conveyance of certain property, title 
to which is claimed, must be first established and then re-
citals may assist in showing the limits or extent of the prop-
erty conveyed. With respect to the situation on 2nd West 
in Murray there must first be proof of the establishment 
and existence of a roadway at the time of the deed. Then if 
the existence and use of the roadway is otherwise proved, 
ancient deeds may be admissible as some evidence tending 
to show its boundary or location at that time. 
The usual case where such deeds are admissible in-
volves deeds showing boundary lines between present oc-
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cupants of property where there is a dispute between them, 
and one party will be held to be bound by recitals made in 
deeds by his predecessor in title. And even then, recitals 
showing such boundary are not admissible unless it is 
shown that the original deed by which the property in ques-
tion was conveyed, in which the boundary was set forth, 
is lost. As stated by Wigmore, Third Ed., Vol. V, p. 431: 
"That such a recital is not admissible where the original 
deed recited is not accounted for as lost or the like seems 
unquestioned." Therefore, in the case at bar there would 
have to be proof of a deed or other conveyance granting the 
4-rod strip to the county as a county road or some other 
formal action showing the actual esta)>lishment of such 4-
rod strip as a county road, plus a showing that the original 
deed or dedication is lost ;-but there must be no question 
but that there was an actual conveyance or establishment 
of such county road, and then perhaps such deeds would be 
admissible to help define the boundaries of the road. 
Another case referred to by Wigmore is Drury v. 
Afidland R. Co., 127 Mass. 571. The question in that case 
concerned the location of the channel of a creek. There was 
no question about the fact that the creek had actually existed 
and had been filled in. The only question was as to its exact 
location. Plans in ancient documents were held admissible 
tc show the former or original location of the creek. (See 
Section 1575, Wigmore, cited supra.) 
The usual case supporting the text statements above 
referred to is like that of Village of Oxford v. Willoughby, 
(N. Y.), 73 N. E. 677. The city sued to enjoin the defend-
ants from encroaching upon a public street by the construe-
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tion of a building. An ancient deed from one Stevens con-
veying Property to a turnpike company was introduced in 
evidence to show the boundary line of the defendants' prop-
erty and the street line, the extent of defendants' property 
which they still held possession of being the question in 
issue. In order to prove their title the defendants had to 
rely on some other deeds from the same Stevens, who was 
a predecessor in interest. There was offered in evidence 
the turnpike deed from Stevens and also a city map which 
had been prepared by Stevens in dedicating some of the 
streets. The court held that the Stevens turnpike deed and 
the map were properly admitted. 
It will be noted here that the question was as to the 
boundary of the street and the boundary of the defendants' 
property, possession of which they held. The present 
possession of defendants' property under deeds from pre-
decessors was admitted, and the prior existence of the street 
was proved without question. THE ACTUAL DEED CON-
VEYING THE TURNPIKE WAS PUT IN EVIDENCE. 
The deeds were admitted merely to locate the boundary 
line, and the deeds under which the defendants themselves 
claimed referred to the Stevens map, which showed the 
boundary line. 
See Twinning v. Goodwin (Conn.), 77 A. 953, where 
the court held that what was generally "understood" and 
"talked about" as to location or existence of a right of way 
was inadmissible. 
See also : 
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. Sella, (Conn.) 
91 A. 972; 
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Horgan v. Town Council of Jamestown, (R. 1.) 
80 A. 271; 
Ray v. Farrow, (Ala.), 100 S. 868. 
See also Wilson v. Snow, 228 U. S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 807, 
33 S. Ct. 487, wherein the United States Supreme Court 
referred to the fact that "the deed was more than thirty 
years old. The possession of the land had for forty years 
been consistent with its terms and it was therefore admissi-
ble as an ancient deed * * * " 
OLD DEEDS DO NOT PROVE LOCATION OF ROAD-
WAY AS CONTENDED BY APPELLANT. 
There is one other thing to which we must call the 
court's attention in connection with the ancient deeds and 
recitals therefrom as introduced by appellant over plain-
tiff's objection. The witness Wood, as engineer of Murray 
City, made an actual survey of the area (R. 66) and pre-
pared Exhibit D-12 from such actual survey. After making 
the actual survey, he took the deeds according to the descrip-
tions as furnished by Abstracter Lund and platted them on 
the map as produced from his actual survey (R. 68). With 
respect to the Exhibit D-12, the line of the railroad itself, 
2nd West, and the entire area involved were put on the map 
from actual field survey (R. 71-72). Then the descriptions 
in the deeds produced by Lund were platted on the map,-
"if you measured in the field you would get the same thing 
you would get on the map" (R. 71). From those descriptions 
as given, it will be seen on Exhibit D-12 that the 4-rod street 
as so referred to in the deeds lies entirely to the west of the 
railroad track. Therefore, even if the descriptions in the 
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deeds were taken at face value, they would not prove what 
appellant and its counsel seem to contend but could not 
help but indicate that such 4-rod street as referred to in 
the deeds lay entirely to the west of the railroad tracks 
as constructed. We merely refer to this aside from any 
question of admissibility of such deeds or of any proof of 
actual possession of or existence or use of any such roadway 
prior to 1900. 
OFFICIAL HIGHWAY MAP AND OFFICIAL MURRAY 
CITY PLAT DISPROVE EXISTENCE AND USE OF 
2ND WEST AS A PUBLIC ROADWAY OR STREET 
PRIOR TO 1900. 
When Utah was admitted to the Union as a state one 
of the first acts of the State Legislature was to authorize 
the compilation and issuance of revised statutes. As a re-
sult of this legislative action, the Revised Statutes of Utah 
of 1898 were put into force and became effective as of 
January 1, 1898. Section 1122 of those Revised Statutes 
provided: 
"It shall be the duty of the Board of County 
Commissioners in each county immediately to de-
termine all public highways existing in its county, 
and to prepare in duplicate, plats and specific de-
scriptions of the same and of such other highways as 
such Board may from time to time locate upon pub-
lic lands, one copy of which shall be kept on file in 
the office of the County Clerk, and the other, said 
Board shall cause to be filed in the office of the 
State Board of Land Commissioners." 
As a result of and pursuant to this statutory mandate 
the county surveyor of Salt Lake County did prepare a map 
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of all of the public highways in Salt Lake County and under 
date of March 7, 1898 this official map was presented to 
and approved by the County Commissioners (R. 148). 
Minutes from the County Commissioners' records as of that 
date show: "Map of Salt Lake County showing particularly 
the highways was presented to the board by County Surveyor 
Wilcox. On motion said map is hereby accepted as the of-
ficial map of the State of Utah highways and the county 
surveyor is directed to file one with the county clerk and 
one with the State Board of Land Commissioners in ac-
cordance with the statute of 1898." The map as introduced 
(Ex. P-34), was one of three maps together designated as 
"G-16 A, B, C." The three maps were three sections making 
a complete county map and together constitute the same as 
one map covering the whole of Salt Lake county (R. 150). 
The maps are dated, drawn to a scale which is indicated on 
each map, and certified to as the official maps presented 
to and accepted by the County Commission pursuant to the 
statute above quoted. The certification as so contained on 
such maps is shown by Exhibit P-35. These maps were and 
are a part of the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Surveyor's office (R. 154). 
On Exhibit P-34 there is shown a "highway" designated 
as "highway No. 10." It is shown as being a direct continu-
ation of 2nd West Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and ex-
tends directly south from 2nd West Street in Salt Lake City 
in approximately a direct southerly line until after it crosses 
Little Cottonwood Creek in the NE 1,4 of Section 12, T. 2 S., 
Range 1 West. From that point the highway bears slightly 
to the east and near the southern line of Section 12 crosses 
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both the Rio Grande and Oregon Short Line railroad tracks 
and continues to extend in a southeasterly direction through 
the NE 14 of Section 13, and also in a southeast direction 
through the N ¥2 of the SE 14 of Section 13, until it meets 
and crosses what is designated as highway No. 76 coming 
west from State Street. Said street designated as highway 
No. 10 continues on thence southerly through the E 112 of 
Section 24, and into the NE 14 of Section 25, crossing 
a highway designated as highway No. 79 in the Northeast 
quarter of Section 24. The map shows that said highway 
No. 10, after crossing the Rio Grande and Oregon Short 
Line tracks near the south line of Section 12 continues to 
bear to the east and, rather than following the Oregon Short 
Line railroad tracks, extends and goes on southeasterly and 
then south some distance to the east of the Oregon Short 
Line tracks. The map being drawn on a scale of 2000 feet 
to the inch shows that this highway No. 10 is Ij8th of an 
inch, or 250 feet, east of the Oregon Short Line tracks at 
the center line of Section 13; is 3/16th of an inch, or 375 
feet, east of the Oregon Short Line tracks where it crosses 
highway No. 76 in the North half of the Southeast quarter 
of Section 13; and then it continues at approximately the 
same distance (which would be approximately 375 feet) 
east of the Oregon Short Line railroad tracks as it crosses 
the dividing line between Sections 13 and 24 and as it 
continues on southerly beyond highway No. 79 and on into 
Section 25. 
It is inconceivable that if there had been a traveled 
area on either side of the Oregon Short Line tracks which 
had been used and traveled sufficiently in any respect to 
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be considered as a public highway it would not have been 
shown on this official map in some way or another. This 
map was made pursuant to statutory mandate directing 
that the county make and file a map showing all public 
highways and was submitted by the county surveyor as 
such, accepted by the county commissioners as such OFFIC-
IAL MAP, and one copy was filed with the county clerk 
and one with the State Board of Land Commissioners pur-
suant to the statutory mandate. 
When Murray was first incorporated as a city, official 
maps and plats were filed by and on behalf of Murray City 
(R. 81-83) showing the line of the city limits and showing, 
or purporting to show, at least some of the roads and high-
ways within the limits of Murray City. Exhibit D-30 is a 
photostat of such official map or "official plat" as filed by 
Murray City with the county recorder at the time Murray 
was incorporated (R. 90). This Murray "official plat" was 
filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder under 
date of December 1, 1902 (R. 90). An examination of such 
exhibit shows a highway, designated thereon as highway 
No. 10, as coming in approximately a southerly direction 
into the Northeast quarter of Section 12, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 West. At approximately what would be the east-
west center line, if the Northeast quarter of Section 12 were 
so divided (which would be approximately the point where 
such roadway would cross Little Cottonwood Creek), said 
highway No. 10 turns and bears to the southeast in exactly 
the same manner and follows the same line of direction as 
such highway No. 10 is shown to follow on Exhibit P-34. 
Although the Oregon Short Line railroad track is not shown 
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with reference to this highway, it will be noted that as 
said highway No. 10 crosses the south line of Section 12 
and into what would be the Northeast quarter of Section 
13 it is still extending in the same southeast direction, and 
instead of going on approximately a north-south line, as 
the railroad track does, it continues to diverge to the east, 
farther and farther away from what would be the center 
line of both Sections 12 and 13. 
In about 1905, Murray City extended- its city limits 
and a further "official plat Murray" was filed and recorded 
in the office of the county recorder under date of June 26, 
1905,-Exhibit D-29 (R. 90). On this plat for the first time 
there is shown extending through the S 1/2 of the NE 1;4 of 
Section 13, and through the SE 1;4 of Section 13, and into 
the NE 1;4 of Section 24, a segment of "highway No. 10," 
which coincides with and is superimposed upon the Oregon 
Short Line railroad, and as will be readily seen by ordinary 
observation and more clearly by placing a ruler on such 
map, said "highway No. 10" rather than extending in a 
southeasterly direction as it extends southerly, bears slight-
ly to the west of south, being some distance closer to the 
north-south center line of Section 24 than to the north-south 
center line of Sections 12 and 13 where those two sections 
meet. 
The official plat Exhibit D-30 was filed as an official 
act by Murray City on incorporation and would constitute 
an admission by Murray City as of that time that highway 
No. 10, whether it be in actual existence or only in con-
templation, extended in a southeasterly direction through 
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the area involved. It would be an admission on the part of 
Murray City and an acknowledgment by Murray City that 
such highway No. 10 as shown on Exhibit P-34 was correct, 
and a further acknowledgment that as of that time there 
was no official roadway or highway extending north and 
south along the Oregon Short Line railroad tracks, and 
the only time and the first time that such highway No. 10 
is shown or claimed to coincide with the Oregon Short Line 
railroad tracks is by the Exhibit D-29 as filed and recorded 
on June 26, 1905 (R. 90). 
These official maps should be conClusive evidence, Ex-
hibit P-34 having been made and filed pursuant to statutory 
mandate, to effectively conclude the matter here and furnish 
sufficient basis upon which the trial court, as the trier of 
fact, should have concluded as he did, that there was no 
roadway established immediately adjacent to and within 
the 2-rod area east of the railroad tracks, but which, to-
gether with entire lack of evidence of use of any roadway 
while the property was still public domain, likewise should 
have been sufficient to compel a conclusion on the part of 
the court that there was no public roadway or highway of 
any kind immediately adjacent to or following closely either 
side of the railroad track at any time prior to the period 
between 1900 and 1905, and that therefore the only right 
that is shown or could be shown by the evidence to any road-
way along such track is a prescriptive right acquired along 
the west side of the track by use since such use was started 
sometime between 1900 and 1905, and very apparently 
started with the construction and placing in operation of the 
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American Smelting & Refining Company's plant in about 
1903. 
That there has been some change in this so-called high-
way No. 10 is very apparent from the photostats of the so-
called "Bible" introduced in evidence by defendant (R. 
167-170), but which photostats were supplied after con-
clusion of the trial and therefore appear as unnumbered ex-
hibits. Pages 94 and 95 of such photostats, being designated 
"Field notes of the survey of Highway No. 10 (Second W. 
St.)," show such 2nd West Street or "highway No. 10" 
starting from 13th South as it was then designated, or what 
is as we know it today-2700 South, as shown by the pencil 
notations (R. 170-171), and shows a continuation of this 
2nd West Street in an almost direct southerly course, bear-
ing in one column a direction of "S. 0°1' W.," and in a 
second column "S. 0°9' W.," and in a third column "S. 0°10' 
E." The pencil notations show that this street at such time 
extended thus from 2700 South to a point after it crossed 
4500 South as we know such streets today. However, the 
witness Wahlquist testified (R. 113), that the north end 
of this 2nd West Street today is at about 43rd South and 
it is not straight from there on south. The roadway comes 
straight from 4300 South to 4800 South, then jogs to the 
east, then goes south almost to 5300 South, and turns off 
a little bit to the west as it comes into 5300 South, then in 
order to go on south on 2nd West you have to come a ways 
east on 5300 South and turn down between the Oregon Short 
Line and Denver & Rio Grande tracks (R. 114). There have 
undoubtedly been a number of changes throughout the 
whole area and if we want to conjecture or assume, as ap-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
pellant has done in so many instances, we should perhaps 
assume some change in the roadway near the south line of 
Section 12 at the time the American Smelting & Refining 
plant was built. But whether we conjecture or not, the 
evidence by these field notes of actual survey of Highway 
No. 10 shows that such highway No. 10 is not the same 
today north of 4500 South as it was when this actual sur-
vey was made, and whether such highway No. 10 was in 
actual existence or only contemplated as it extended farther 
south through Sections 12, 13 and 24, it is apparent that 
there have been some changes made. However, one IF that 
I think we are justified in urging here, is that if there had 
been any public roadway or highway adjacent to and paral-
leling the Oregon Short Line railroad tracks through this 
area in 1898 when Exhibit P-34 was made, or in 1902 when 
Exhibit D-30 was officially filed, such roadway would have 
been shown at least on the official mandated map, Exhibit 
P-34, if not also on Exhibit D-30, and particularly would 
any public roadway along the tracks have been shown if 
such highway No. 10 as it so extended into the area was not 
actually in existence as claimed by defendant, and if the 
roadway along the tracks was in existence as claimed by 
defendants. 
Again we state, these official maps and official plats 
are conclusive to show that there was no public road or 
highway adjacent to or paralleling the railroad tracks in 
question prior to sometime between 1898 and 1905. There-
fore, all that the defendants can claim under the evidence 
in this case is a prescriptive right acquired by actual use and 
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travel over the roadway to the west of the track during the 
past approximately 50 years. 
(b) SECTION 43 U. S. C. A. 932, GRANTING 
RIGHTS OF WAY "FOR THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF HIGHWAYS OVER PUBLIC LANDS" DOES 
APPLY TO RAILROADS, AND THE PRE-
DECESSORS IN INTEREST OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS HEREIN ACQUIRED A VALID RIGHT 
OF WAY THEREUNDER. 
Counsel for appellant admits that "this section has 
been construed in a number of cases" and admits that with 
respect to the position he takes there is some conflict of 
authority, but counsel urges in his brief that "in spite of 
the conflict of authority" the case of Burlington, K. & S. 
W. R. Co. v. Johnson (Kan., 1887), 16 P. 125, is "the best 
reasoned one" of such cases. It is true that in said case the 
Kansas Supreme Cou:rt held that the term ~'highways" did 
not include railroads. A study of that case, however, will 
convince anyone that such a decision was not necessary to 
the determination of that case, a number Qf other valid and 
much more compelling reasons being set forth in the opinion 
to support the judgment in the case, which involved as "the 
principal point in controversy'' the measure of damages to 
which J obnson was entitled. Reference was made in the 
opinion to the fact that rulings of the federal land depart-
ment prior to the date of that case held that "a valid home ... 
stead entry operates as an appropriation and reservation 
of the land embraced in the same * * * " and "* * * 
segregates the tract from the mass of the public domain." 
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Therefore, whether the statutory use of the word "high-
ways" referred to railroads or not, the particular land had 
by the homestead entry been segregated from the public 
domain so that no sort of a highway could have been 
acquired over it. Under early law it was held that lands 
subject to homestead entry were still property of the United 
States as Public Domain and the government held full title 
to the same until patent was issued. That theory, however, 
was changed, first, by the land department's rulings, and 
later by the courts themselves, the Supreme Court case of 
Hastings & Dakota R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, 10 S. 
Ct. 112, 33 L. Ed. 363, which was decided shortly after the 
Johnson case, holding that a valid homestead entry is a 
sufficient appropriation of land to segregate the homestead 
tract from the public domain and that such homestead entry 
precluded the possibility of any subsequent grant of such 
tract by Congress in any manner. 
The real basis and purport of the decision in the John-
son case was that "the land when homesteaded ceased to 
be a part of the public domain," that "the homestead entry 
gives the homesteader the exclusive right of possession, not 
only against individuals, but against the government." See 
United States v. Turner, 54 Fed. 228 (1892), which cited 
and followed the Johnson case and referred to it as holding 
that "the homestead entry operated as an appropriation 
and reservation of the lands embraced in the same, and seg~ 
regated the tract from the public domain." This view of 
the Johnson case has been confirmed by the Supreme Court 
of Kansas itself. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Harris, (Kan-
sas), 91 P. 68. 
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Appellant's counsel, although admitting some conflict 
in the authority, refers to the Johnson case as "the best 
reasoned one." We firmly disagree and insist that the best 
reasoned case is the case of Flint & P. M. Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 
(Mich. 1879), 2 N. W. 648. The writer of the opinion in 
the Michigan case was Judge Cooley, who was early recogn-
ized as an authority and has long been recognized as ali 
eminent authority on constitutional and statutory subjects. 
In a rather exhaustive opinion Judge Cooley held that rail-
ways, though not strictly highways like plank and maca-
damized roads, were "highways" within the section of the 
federal act referred to and were entitled to the benefit of 
the provisions of that act. Judge Cooley referred to the fact 
that an earlier act of Congress, passed in 1852, had been 
allowed to expire, and that the act of Congress of July, 
1866, in which the statute referred to was contained, was 
the only authoritative law on the subject at the time. 
In the Michigan case, a homestead entryman had set-
tled upon the land but had not yet acquired his patent. The 
railroad company had located its line across his land and 
the question was as to whether or not the railroad company 
was authorized to acquire the right of way under the sec-
tion above quoted. We quote from Judge Cooley's opinion: 
"The section of the act of 1866, on which re-
liance is placed, declares 'that the right of way for 
the construction of highways over public lands, not 
reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.' This is 
not limited in time, and seems to be amply sufficient 
in scope, if railways are highways within its mean-
ing. This is disputed. 
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"There is no doubt that when the term 'high-
ways' is used in legislation, the common highways 
for the country are generally to be understood. But 
this is not universally true. There are other high-
ways than these, and the sense in which the word i8 
employed must be determined by the end which the 
legislation has in view, and by the context. Here a 
right of way is given for highways, and the question 
is whether the purpose was to give the right for other 
roads than the common wagon roads of the country, 
or other roads open to the public for use in the same 
way. 
"The subject is not free from doubt, but we are 
inclined to think, and shall so hold, that all highways 
were intended. A forcible reason for this conclusion 
is that we can conceive of no considerations operat-
ing to induce congress to grant the right of way for 
wagon roads, and not grant it for other public high. 
ways. * * * It is a matter of notoriety that, in 
the absence of legislation, roads have been freely 
laid out across the public lands, without objection or 
controversy, wherever the lands were not appropri-
ated or desired for other public uses. Such roads 
facilitate the settlement of the country, and benefit 
the neighborhood, and in both particulars they fur. 
ther a general policy of the federal government. But 
they also tend to increase the value of the public 
lands, and for this reason are favored. And what 
the common highways of the country accomplish in 
this direction the railroads of the country accomp-
lish to a much greater extent. 
"As bearing upon the construction of the act of 
1866 we may well take notice of the fact that, at the 
time the United States were seeking to stimulate and 
encourage the construction of railroads in the newer 
sections of the ·country by making large grants of 
land to the projectors, two motives may be said to 
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have influenced this action: First, the general bene-
fit to the country by encouraging new settlements; 
second, the general benefit to the interest of the 
United States, as proprietor of other lands, by giv-
ing to such other lands additional market value, and 
creating increased demand for them. It would cer-
tainly be very remarkable if, while thus pursuing a 
policy of liberal encouragement to railroads, the 
United States should purposely withhold a favor so 
unimportant to the government as permission to 
cross the public domain ; a permission, too, almost 
certain, so far as it had influence, to be beneficial. 
It would be specially remarkable if, in so withhold-
ing this privilege, the United States were, in fact, 
discriminating against this form of thoroughfare. 
"It is true railroads are not, in the proper sense 
of that terms, highways, but they have been fre-
quently called highways in the decisions of the fed-
eral supreme court. Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 
654, 663; Railroad Company v. County of Ottoe, 16 
Wall. 667, 673. It is not an unreasonable inference 
that the legislative department of the government 
rnay sometimes have employed the word in the same 
sens~. Plank-roads and macadamized roads, which 
are open to use by the whole public with their own 
teams and vehicles, are highways in the strictest 
sense, and yet these, which with railroads were pro-
vided for specially by the act of 1852, are only pro-
vided for now by the act of 1866. We may well sup-
pose that the act of 1852 was limited in terms to the 
roads constructed by private companies, because the 
tacit acquiescence by the United States in the con-
struction of highways by the states and territories 
over its lands made further provisions unnecessary; 
but that act was suffered to expire because subse-
quently it was deemed best, by a general provision 
in the act of 1866, to embrace all public ways, this 
at once giving the sanction of law to the custom of 
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taking public lands for common wagon roads, and 
providing for other roads also. This would account 
for the fact, which otherwise would at least seem 
very strange, that congress suffered the limitation 
in time, imposed by the act of 1852, to run out 
without making any new or further provision for 
the special benefit of the companies which by that 
act were favored. All the considerations which 
should lead to the assistance of such companies, so 
far as the giving of a right of way would assist 
them, are as forcible today as they ever were. They 
were not peculiar to the twenty-five years following 
the enactment of the law of 1852. 
"V.f e shall hold, therefore, that the act of 1866, 
which gives a right of way for all highways, em-
braces within its intent railways, and that by force 
of it the complainant was entitled to a right of way 
across the lands in dispute unless the homestead 
entry of defendant constituted an impediment. 
* * * * 
"To acquire the benefit tendered by the act of 
1866 nothing more was necessary than for the road 
to be constructed. No patent is required in such 
cases ; but the offer and acceptance taken together 
are equivalent to a grant. The complainant, there-
fore, by accepting the offer of the government, ob-
tained a grant of the right of way which was at least 
perfectly good as against the government, and must 
be held to be perfectly good as against this defen-
dant unless his patent ante-dates it by relation, or 
unless the equities springing from his possession and 
improvement would preclude any right being ac-
quired adversely. 
* * * * 
"It is not very clear that under the general rail· 
road law so peculiar an interest as that of the de. 
fendant could have been appropriated by adversary 
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proceedings, and it is certain that complainant could 
have been under no obligation to proceed to an ap-
propriation of the interest of the United States, if 
that interest was freely granted by that act of 1866, 
as we think it was. Complainant accepted the offer 
of that act, and the contruction of its road under 
the offer would be not only a sufficient but also an 
equitable consideration. And when the right was 
thus perfected we do not think it could have been 
defeated by any act or relation springing from the 
accomplishment of something subsequently." 
It will be noted that some question was raised as to the 
right of the homesteader to require payment for his inter-
est in the land and although it seBmed that the court de-
cided against the entryman on that point, still the question 
was not seriously in dispute because of the fact that the 
railroad company had offered to make such payment, and 
concerning these improvements the court said: 
"We should infer from the statement of facts 
that those actually made within the limits of the 
right of way were inconsiderable, and for those the 
complainant offered to make payment. * * * 
the decree should have allowed the defendant to take 
a reference to compute the value of the improve-
ments made within the limits appropriated by com-
plainants, and it will be modified by this court so 
as to permit that to be done." 
About the only case which has directly questioned the 
decision of Judge Cooley" in the Michigan case on his inter-
pretation of the word "highways" is the Johnson case from 
Kansas, and as above stated, such a holding was unnecessary 
in that case and the case has been cited as holding that the 
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homestead entry segregated the land from the public do-
main. 
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Richter, 148 P. 478, 
the Supreme Court of New Mexico quoted and followed 
Judge Cooley's holding in the Michigan case that a railroad 
company could acquire a right of way under the 1866 act. 
In referring to the Michigan case, the New Mexico court 
said: 
"The opinion is by Judge Cooley and for that 
reason if for no other deserves the most careful con-
sideration." 
In that case the New Mexico court held very directly that 
a homestead entryman was entitled to compensation, but 
affirmed the right of the railroad company to acquire a 
right of way under the act of 1866. The New Mexico court 
in that case concluded: 
"We conclude that under Section 2477, R. S. 
U. S., no right can be secured which is superior to 
the right of an intervening coal entryman who has 
filed his declaratory statement prior to the accept-
ance of the grant by a railroad company." 
Under date of March 3, 1875, in order to give further 
impetus to railroad building for development of new areas 
and to expand our national frontiers, Congress passed an 
act specifically giving railroads a 10Q .. foot right of way over 
public domain and imposed certain conditions which had to 
be tnet. Judge Cooley referred to this act in the Michigan 
case, as did some of the other courts who discussed the act 
of 1866. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
------~~~--------------------------
41 
In the case of Tennessee & C. R. Co. v. Taylor, (Ala. 
1894), 14 So. 379, the Supreme Court of Alabama had the 
question of the 1866 act and its application to a railroad 
company before it. A railroad company had taken posses-
sion of a strip of land through the public domain sometime 
prior to the 1875 act ("more than twenty years before suit 
brought"), and had graded a roadbed over the area but 
had not constructed its ties and rails thereon at a time when 
an entryman purchased and secured patent to the property 
from the U. S. Government. As a matter of fact, the rail-
road company had allowed the strip to lie for some time 
uncompleted after it had cleared and graded its roadbed 
thereon, but after the purchase of the title by the individual 
f'rom the U.S. Government the railroad completed this con-
struction and laid its rails and ties over the previously con-
structed roadbed. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that 
the railroad had a "highway'; under the section o£ federal 
statute heretofore referred to. We quote from the opinion 
of the Alabama Supreme Court: 
"The theory of defendant is that it acquired 
title to the 100-foot strip as right of way by the lo-
cation of its line and construction of its roadbed 
thereon prior to the sale to plaintiff, by force of 
section 2477 of the Revised Statutes of the United 
States, which declares that 'the right of way for the 
construction of highways over public lands, not re-
served for public uses, is hereby granted.' That a 
railroad is a 'highway' within this section, would 
seem to have been the understanding of congress in 
the passage of the act of 1866 in aid of the construc-
tion of this and other railroads in Alabama, for 
while careful provision is made by that act for the 
acquisition of a right of way over reserved land em-
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braced in the general terms of the grant, but spec-
ially excepted therefrom, no provision is therein 
made for rights of way over other public land ; an 
omission which, in view of the fact that at that time 
there was no law, state or federal, other than this 
section, for the acquisition of rights of way over 
public lands, is most reasonably accounted for on 
the theory that congress supposed that section 2477 
applied to railroad rights of way over all public 
lands 'not reserved to public uses.' And this is the 
construction put on the section in every instance of 
direct adjudication. Railway Co. v. Gordon, 41 Mich. 
420, 2 N. W. 648; Verdier v. Railroad Co., 15 S. C. 
476; Sams v. Railway Co., !d., 484. Indeed, there 
is nothing in the adjudged cases against this view, 
except the merest dictum in Railroad Co. v. Sture, 
32 Minn. 95, 20 N. W. 229, a case arising under the 
act of March 3, 1875, (18 Stat. 482), which super-
seded the application of section 2477 to railroads, 
and was in the nature of an amendment by impli-
cation to that effect, not, however, affecting rights 
acquired under the section in question prior to the 
amendatory enactment. We concur in the construc-
tion put on the statute by the Michigan and South 
Carolina courts, and hold that it operated to grant 
rights of way for the construction of railway high-
ways over public lands at the time the defendant 
located its line and constructed its roadbed on the 
strip sued for." 
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Wallowa County v. 
Wade, 72 P. 793, uses the following language in referring 
to the 1866 act : 
"While the language of this act is somewhat 
indefinite and uncertain it has usually been con-
strued as a present grant of an easement over pub-
lic lands for highways, and that it is not confined to 
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technical public highways, but is applicable to rail-
ways and toll roads." 
The fact that railroads were considered as highways 
is further confirmed by early text writers. Elliot on Roads 
and Streets, Third Edition, Vol. 1: 
"* * * the term highway is the generic 
name for all kinds of public ways, including county 
and township roads, streets, alleys, turnpikes and 
plank roads, railroads and tramways, bridges and 
ferries, canals and navigable rivers." 
So. K. Ry. Co. v. Oklahoma (Okla.), 69 P. 1050; 
Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279, 26 
S. Ct. 91, 50 L. Ed. 192; 
Strange v. Board of Commissioners (Ind.), 91 
N. E. 242; 
Detroit International Bridge Co. v. American 
Seed Co., (Mich.), 228 N. W. 791. 
The early constitutions of many of the states provided 
that railroads were public highways. The Utah Constitu-
tion merely states that railroads are common carriers sub-
ject to legislative control (Art. XII, Sec. 12), but in the 
Constitution of the State of Idaho, adopted approximately 
ten years before the Utah Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 5, it 
was provided : 
"All railroads shall be public highways, and all 
railroad transportation and express companies shall 
be common carriers and subject to legislative con-
trol." 
This Idaho provision was similar to a provision of the 
New York Constitution, as well as that of many other states 
joining the Union prior to Idaho. 
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In determining whether the Johnson case from Kansas 
contains "the best reasoning" or whether Judge Cooley's 
opinion does, we must consider the background against 
which each of the judges at the time may have interpreted 
the statutory provision. Interpretation of such a provision 
based upon conditions as we know them today would clearly 
give us a different outlook than might have been the case 
in 1866. The opinion of Judge Cooley, issued in 1879, was 
preceded only three years by a decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States which gives somewhat of a his-
tory of the development of railroads and the understanding 
that was had of them, not alone by members of the public 
but by members of congress and legislators generally. We 
refer to the case of Lake Superior & Miss. R. R. Co. v. 
United States (1876), 93 U.S. 442, 23 L. Ed. 965. The op-
ening paragraph of the opinion reads: 
"Congress, in most of the legislative acts by 
which it has made donations of the public lands to 
the States in which they lie for the purpose of aid-
ing in the construction of railroads, has stipulated 
that the railroads so aided shall be public highway~ 
for the use of the government, free from all tolls or 
other charge for transportation of its property or 
troops." 
The Supreme Court, in the opinion, refers to an early stat-
ute and says : 
"It will be observed that the last-cited act was 
passed in 1833, when railroads were about being in-
troduced as means of public communication in this 
country. It is undoubtedly familiar to most of those 
whose recollection goes back to that period, that 
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railroads were generally expected to be public high .. 
ways, on which every man who could procure the 
proper carriages and apparatus would have the 
right to travel. This was the understanding in 
England, where they originated. The Railway 
Clauses Consolidation Act, passed in 1842, provided 
in detail for the use of railways by all persons who 
might choose to put carriages thereon, upon payment 
of the tolls demandable, subject to the provisions of 
the statute and the regulations of the company." 
The court then goes on to refer to various statutes, includ .. 
ing those setting up the charters of early railroads, and 
likewise refers to the trend of development of railroads to 
the point where the railroad companies not only provided 
the "highway", but also furnished the vehicles and per-
formed the complete course of transportation. The Supreme 
Court then states: 
"Be this, however, as it may, the general course 
of legislation referred to sufficiently demonstrates 
the fact, that in the early history of railroads it was 
quite generally supposed that they could be publie 
highways in fact as well as in name." 
The foregoing Supreme Court case while only three 
years ahead of Judge Cooley's decision in the Michigan 
case was still ten years after the date of the 1866 statute. 
The Johnson case in Kansas was nearly ten years after 
the Michigan case, during which time following the general 
railroad right of way act of March 3, 1875, there was great 
railroad expansion throughout the country and a general 
development of railroads into large general transportation 
companies rather than companies which merely provided 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46 
a "highway" for the vehicles of others. It was apparent 
that the Judge in the Johnson case was influenced by the 
later development and saw what was immediately before 
him and did not, as Judge Cooley did, go back the nearly 
twenty years to see what the actual background was at the 
time and prior to the time of the passing of the act of 1866. 
Indeed the development of railroads into general transpor-
tation companies rather than companies which merely con-
structed and operated a "highway" like a plank road or 
toll road furnished the basis for a separate act with respect 
to them as was embodied in the act of March 3, 1875. This 
does not afford a basis for reasoning that the 1866 act did 
not apply to railroads, but indicates very strongly that it 
did, and the act of 1875 became necessary because of the 
difference in the trend of the development of railroads gen-
erally. 
A still earlier case from the Supreme Court of the 
United States, decided one year after the construction of 
the railroad involved in the case at bar and before the act 
of Congress of 1875, providing specifically for railroad 
rights of way over the public domain, is the case of Olcott 
v. The Supervisors, (1872), 16 Wall. 678. In that case, at 
page 694, the Supreme Court stated: 
"That railroads, though constructed by private 
corporations and owned by them, are public high-
ways, has been the doctrine of nearly all the courts 
ever since such conveniences for passage and trans-
portation have had any existence." 
The court goes on to say that the building of a railroad is 
considered as an act done for a public use and then adds: 
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"And the reason why the use has always been 
held a public one is that such a road is a highway, 
whether made by the government itself or by the 
agency of corporate bodies, or even by individuals 
when- they obtain their power to construct it from 
legislative grant." 
* * * * 
"That all persons may not put their own cars 
upon the road, and use their own motive power, has 
no bearing upon the question whether the road is 
a public highway." 
* * * * 
"It is said that railroads are not public high-
ways per se; that they are only declared such by 
the decisions of the courts, and that they have been 
declared public only with respect to the power of 
eminent domain. This is a mistake. In their very 
nature they are public highways. It needed no de-
cision of courts to make them such." 
If anything more authoritative or showing a "better rea-
soning" could be had we think that it could not possibly 
change the conclusion that when the act of 1866 was passed 
it was considered by congress, the courts, and the public in 
general that railroads were "highways" and therefore in-
cluded with the act of 1866. 
In Cherokee Nation v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 135 U. S. 
641, at 657, 10 S. Ct. 965, 34 L. Ed. 295, the United States 
Supreme Court, in 1890, again reaffirms these prior cases 
as follows: 
"* * * the question is no longer an open 
one, as to whether a railroad is a public highway, 
established primarily for the convenience of the 
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people, and to subserve public ends, and, therefore, 
subject to governmental control and regulation. It 
is because it is a public highway * * * " 
In view of the foregoing, there is no escape from the 
conclusion that the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff 
in the case at bar were included within the provisions of 
the 1866 federal act and entitled to a right of way over the 
public domain for construction of the railroad. As was 
stated by Judge Cooley: "To acquire the benefit tendered 
by the act of 1866 nothing rnore was necessary than for the 
road to be constructed. No patent is required in such cases." 
This actual construction is held by all the cases to amount 
to an acceptance of the grant. There is and can be no dis-
pute of the fact that the predecessor of plaintiff actually 
constructed its railroad here at a time when the property 
was still public domain. It thereby acquired a right of way 
under the federal act referred to. But it even went further 
and afterwards secured full warranty deeds from adjoining 
owners whose subsequently issued patents included the 
property on which the railroad had been constructed. 
APPELLANT'S POINT 1 (d) 
Under its point (d) Murray City refers to abandon-
ment. We do not know just what appellant has in mind 
with respect to this point. There has been no intimation 
or suggestion that there has been any abandonment of any 
of the traveled portion of the roadway as it has existed 
west of the tracks. If the appellant intends to refer to a 
supposed roadway 1·eferred to in the ancient deeds, our only 
answer is that there is no sufficient competent evidence of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
49 
the establishment of a roadway at any place other than 
that as now used west of the tracks. The recitals in the 
deeds no more prove the existence of a roadway north of 
6400 South than they do south of 6400 South, where all of 
plaintiff's witnesses admit there never was a roadway. The 
supposed roadway referred to in the ancient deeds, as shown 
by Murray engineer's own platting (Exhibit D-12), would 
have been to the west of the tracks, anyway, where a pre-
scriptive right of travel has been acquired. 
The only competent and proper evidence of any nature 
shows a roadway having been acquired by use west of the 
tracks, with such use beginning around 1900 or shortly 
thereafter, at the time Murray City was incorporated as a 
city and at the time the American Smelting & Refining 
smelter was located there. The roadway, even as it exists 
west of the tracks, could not have become established under 
the evidence in this case prior to the incorporation of Mur-
ray City in 1903. 
The statute, U. C. A., 1953, section 27-1-3, concerning 
abandonment, as cited by appellant, refers to counties and 
not to cities. Tucker v. Conrad (Ind.), 2 N. E. 803; Sowad-
zki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. 111. 
If appellant by mentioning "abandonment" intended 
to refer to any roadway east of the tracks, we must answer 
that there is no definite, competent evidence from which 
any court could definitely locate and define such a claimed 
roadway. Where did it start, and how far did it extend? 
"It didn't go all the way to 6400 South" (R. 133). The 
mayor testified that such a way was traveled for 300 or 
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400 yards north and south "in front of the school" (R. 121), 
Wahlquist said "400 yards, more or less" (R. 110). Where 
did it cross the tracks? There was no crossing in front of 
the school (R. 121). All of the homes east of the tracks 
have private crossings over the tracks (Exhibit P-11). 
Would one of these be the terminus, and if so which one? 
All of these private crossings have apparently been in ex-
istence "since the memory of man runneth not to the con-
trary." Did any of these owners use a roadway east of the 
tracks instead of crossing over to the west? If so, why the 
private crossing over the tracks immediately in front of 
each private home? And who used this supposed roadway? 
The mayor and Mr. Wahlquist used it about two years each 
to go to the Liberty School around 1903 to 1905. Aside 
from that, the mayor said people going to do business with 
the Pioneer Nurseries used it (R. 133). This would indi-
cate a private rather than a public roadway. And where 
was it located with reference to the track? It was supposed 
to pass in front of the Liberty School. The school as it 
exists today was constructed in 1905 (R. 104). As shown 
by Exhibit P-20, with such roadway passing in front of the 
school it would have to have been some distance to the east 
of the tracks and railroad right of way. When 6100 South 
Street was opened in 1905, about the time the new school 
was constructed (R. 106), it was extended right across to 
the west side of the tracks. If there was a definite road-
way east of the tracks in that vicinity, the people to the 
north and south would have used it more than ever before 
and would have gone east to State Street over 6100 South 
Street. They would not have crossed the tracks to the west 
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in front of their homes and then gone north or south to 
6100 South Street and recrossed the tracks to east; they 
would have continued to travel east of the track to 6100 
South Street and then east to State Street, and the roadway 
east of the tracks would thus have been continued in use 
to date, as well as that west of the tracks. Not only that, 
but there would have been some evidence of the location of 
the roadway, rather than hills and hollows, irrigation 
ditches and depressed cattail swamps as exist today in the 
area east of the tracks (Exhibits P-20 to P-24). 
It is impossible to conclude from the evidence that 
there was any definitely established public roadway to the 
east of the tracks, and the trial court, as the trier of fact, 
who not only saw and heard the witnesses but made a per-
sonal inspection of the area, must be affirmed in so far as 
his conclusions with respect to lack of any roadway east of 
the tracks is concerned. 
Again, we repeat and confidently urge that there must 
be a highway shown to exist in the first instance before 
there can be any necessity of argument with respect to 
abandonment of such a highway. 
RESPONDENT'S POINTS 1 AND 1 (A) 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MUR-
RAY CITY HELD IN TRUST FOR THE PUB-
LIC A FEE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY DE-
SCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 17 OF THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT MURRAY CITY AND THE PUBLIC 
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HELD ONLY PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS IN 
SAID DESCRIBED PROPERTY. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING, AS SET 
FORTH IN FINDING NUMBER 9, THAT THE 
PUBLIC USED AND ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF 
WAY OVER SAID PROPERTY WHILE THE 
SAME WAS STILL PUBLIC DOMAIN. 
Respondent will here combine reference to its points 
1 and 1 (A). 
There is and can be no dispute concerning the fact 
that the Utah Southern Railroad Company, predecessor in 
interest of the plaintiff railroad companies, secured full 
warranty deeds from the patentees who secured proper 
title from the United States Government to all but a small 
strip of land involved herein. With respect to that small 
strip in the north portion of Section 24, the railroad com-
pany's records indicated a right by court order over that 
strip of property, but plaintiff was unable to secure or 
furnish proper evidence of that court order (R. 41). How-
ever, a copy of the ownership plat from the county record-
er's office was introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-6. The 
county recorder is required by law to make and maintain 
ownership plats showing the ownership of each tract of land 
in the county. He must keep these plats up to date and 
furnish a copy each year to the county assessor for tax 
assessment purposes, and the tax assessor, after assessing 
taxes, must return the plats to the recorder for corrections, 
changes or additions for each ensuing year. (Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, Title 17, Chapter 21, Sections 21 to 23.) 
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The assessor uses these in making up his tax assessment 
rolls, for tax purposes. The county recorder is not required 
to go back of 1899 to check these ownership plats. The 
reason the year 1899 is given is because such law was first 
enacted in 1899 and has been continued practically un-
changed to date. (See Laws of Utah, 1899, Chapter 41, 
page 61, Section 1.) The fact that the law, even as it exists 
today, indicates the county recorder should go back to 1899 
would indicate that what is shown on the plat, Exhibit P-6, 
is a record of long standing, although it has apparently 
been added to from time to time as is shown by the platted 
subdivisions adjoining the OSL right-of-way property. 
As to such records, Wigmore in his work on Evidence, 
says, Vol. 5, Third Edition, section 1640, page 552: 
"* * * No one maintains that they are con-
clusive, but at least they afford some evidence to a 
rational mind seeking the truth." 
The evidence further shows as to this strip that the 
railroad was built thereon while the land was still public 
domain. This in itself gives a fee title to the railroad com-
pany under the federal act, 43 U. S. C. A. 932. 
The evidence shows without contradiction that the 
4-rod strip in the north portion of Section 24 has been 
enclosed within right-of-way fences since about 1917 (Ex-
hibits D-10 and P-37), and is so fenced today (R. 109-110). 
Since 1917, this strip, together with the rest of the area, 
as shown on Exhibits P-7, 8, and 9, has, by exact platting 
and description, been assessed as railroad property and 
taxes paid thereon to the State of Utah and other taxing 
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units, including the City of Murray (R. 47, 50). This evi-
dence should compel the conclusion that the plaintiff Oregon 
Short Line Railroad Company is the owner in fee simple of 
this strip of land in the north portion of Section 24. As 
to all the remainder of the property involved in this action 
there cannot be any dispute as to the title received by the 
railroad company by virtue of the warranty deeds from 
the patentees in addition to building said railroad track 
over the land while it was public domain, which in itself 
give~ a fee title. 
As contrasted to this evidence, there is no competent 
evidence of any kind of any USE of any of the area as a 
roadway while it was public domain, nor at any time prior 
to about 1900. 
The use by the public generally of this strip west of 
the tracks has been of a sufficient nature and of sufficient 
duration to require a holding that the public has acquired 
a right of way by prescription in such westerly strip. 
It would be but useless repetition to refer here to the 
many authorities and to repeat the argument included in 
pages 12 to 19 and 25 to 33 of this brief. In connection with 
respondent's points 1 and 1 (A), we wish merely to refer the 
court back to what has been said on page 12 of this brief-
that we would apply the argument and law then being set 
forth to our later reference to respondent's points 1 and 
1 (A). The argument and the authorities therein referred to 
are as pertinent to respondent's points 1 and 1 (A) as they 
are to respondent's view of appellant's points 1 (a), (b) and 
(c), and we think they must compel a conclusion in favor 
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of the position taken by the respondent, that the railroad 
company has the fee title to the full 4-rod width and the 
defendant Murray City and the public generally merely a 
prescriptive right, over the defined area to the west of the 
tracks. 
RESPONDENT'S POINTS 2 AND 3. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS IT 
DID IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DE-
CREE THAT MURRAY CITY HAD THE RIGHT 
TO LAY SEWER LINES WITHOUT PERMIS-
SION FROM PLAINTIFFS AND ERRED IN 
DENYING THE INJUNCTION SOUGHT BY 
PLAINTIFFS. 
We acknowledge here that if Murray City holds in trust 
for the public the fee title to the strip west of the tracks, 
and if this court should so conclude, then respondent's 
points 2 and 3 would not be well taken. Nevertheless, we 
respectfully urge that such holding is not in any manner 
warranted or justified by the evidence. Assuming, there-
fore, that the rights of the city and the public exist only 
by prescription, what is the extent of those rights? 
We must admit that the right to travel over the sur-
face as pedestrians and by horses, wagons, carts, automo-
biles and other motor vehicles does now and has existed 
for some time by virtue of long-continued use for upwards 
of fifty years. The oil surface has for over twenty years 
past confirmed that use and, in addition, has served to de-
fine the extent of such use. 
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We must admit that the city has by long-continued use 
acquired the right to erect and maintain its power pole line 
down the west side of the traveled portion west of the 
tracks, as well as the right to maintain some poles for 
power line on the east side as now existing for a short 
distance both north and south of 6100 South Street. 
The city also installed a 4-inch culinary water line 
under the surface of the ground to the westerly side of the 
oil surfaced and traveled portion west of the tracks. That 
culinary water line has now existed and been maintained 
a sufficient length of time to establish a right by prescrip-
tion (R. 134-136). Does that prescriptive right to main-
tain a 4-inch culinary water line under the westerly side of 
the traveled portion, give a right-by prescription or other-
wise-to now lay a 12-inch sewer line under such traveled 
portion in close proximity to the railroad tracks? If the 
city does not hold the fee,-an<;I we insist under the evidence 
it cannot-, by what right does it claim to add an addi-
tional burden by laying the sewer line? 
If A acquires a right by prescription to run one irriga-
tion ditch across the property of B, does that right give A 
the license, permission or authority to construct a larger 
and second irrigation ditch across B's land in a different 
location, even though it may parallel and be in close prox-
imity to the first and smaller ditch? It would seem to need 
no authority to bring a vehement denial in answer to the 
latter question. 
"An easement acquired by prescription is al-
ways limited to the use made during the prescriptive 
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period." Robins v. Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 P. 2d 
340; Stephens Ranch & Livestock Co. v. Union Pac. 
R. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 P. 459. 
"A right of way for one purpose gained by user 
cannot be turned into a right of way for another 
purpose if the latter adds materially to the burden 
of the servient estate. * * * The servient es-
tate can only be subjected to the easement to the 
extent to which the easement was acquired and the 
easement owner cannot change this use so as to put 
any greater burden upon the servient estate." Niel-
sen v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d 696. 
"* * * An increase in the burden on the 
servient tenement beyond that caused by the ad-
verse use by which an easement was created is an 
undue increase if it is such an increase as it may 
reasonably be assumed would have provoked an in-
terruption in the adverse use had the increase oc-
curred during the prescriptive period. * * *" 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch v. Moyle, 109 Utah 
197, 159 P. 2d 596. 
The railroad company objected when the city put its 
culinary water line down along the west side of the traveled 
portion west of the track. It insisted on signed agreements 
where the water lines extended under the track (R. 136). 
The use of that area for a culinary water line, however, was 
not a serious threat to the railroad company's property or 
operations, and although the railroad company objected it 
filed no action. THE LAYING OF A 12-INCH SEWER 
MAIN, AT A DEPTH OF 8 FEET, MUCH NEARER THE 
TRACKS IS A DIFFERENT MATTER. The railroad com-
pany did not say it would not permit the laying of the sewer 
but merely asked the city to enter into an agreement to pro-
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teet the railroad properties, and to define the location and 
manner of work to be done, and defining rights during the 
existence of the sewer in such location. The prayer of the 
complaint was for an injunction, unless and until the city 
entered into an agreement with the railroad company, or 
until the city otherwise acquired a right of way by eminent 
domain (R. 5-6). The city refused to do either. 
Railroads all over the country have been installing 
modern electrical control systems for the movement of 
trains. The Union Pacific Railroad Company has such cen-
tralized train control over a good part of its system. It has 
planned to install an electric signal system through Murray, 
and it is even likely that the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion might order installation of centralized train control 
through this area ( R. 64) . In order to install such electri-
cal control, it would be necessary to put underground cables 
to the west of the existing tracks (R. 65) and also to locate 
control boxes west of the tracks. Thus, the use not only 
of the surface immediately west of the track but also of the 
subsurface may become of vital necessity to the railroad 
company, and the right to lay these subsurface cables is 
important even though part of the surface over them may 
be used for public travel. The culinary water line to the 
west would not affect such underground cables, but the 
proposed sewer would. 
The proposition we think is elementary and is unani-
mously supported by all authorities, that the acquisition by 
the public of one easement in land gives no right to an-
other or different easement and a prescriptive way ac-
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quired by a particular user cannot justify a materially en-
larged user which has not been enjoyed for the full pre-
scriptive period. 
If a street or roadway is a dedicated street, as was in-
volved in White v. Salt Lake City, . . . Utah ... , 239 P. 
2d 210, the question presented is a different one because 
in such instance the city or county does hold the fee in 
trust for the public. But there have been no dedicated 
streets in the Murray area involved herein (R. 85-86), and 
where the right of use rests merely in prescription, as the 
one at bar must, then the past right acquired by the pre-
scriptive use cannot be extended or enlarged without per-
mission of the fee owner of the property-the plaintiff 
railroad company in this case. See District of Columbia v. 
Robinson, 180 U. S. 92, 21 S. Ct. 283, 45 L. Ed. 440; Hofius 
v. Carnegie Steel Corp. (Ohio), 67 N. E. 2d 429; City of 
Park Ridge v. Wisner (Ill.), 97 N. E. 841; Ward v. Triple 
State Natural Gas & Oil Co. (Ky.), 74 S. W. 709; Board 
of Supervisors v. Manuel (Va.), 88 S. E. 54; Board of 
Supervisors v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (Va.), 91 S. E. 124. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence clearly and without dispute shows that 
the railroad in question was constructed in its present lo-
cation while the property was all still public domain. Under 
43 U. S. C. A. 932, this gave a right of way in fee to the 
railroad company to such a width as would reasonably be 
necessary for railroad purposes. Immediately upon patents 
being issued, the railroad company secured full warranty 
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deeds from the patentees, enlarging this right of way to 
a strip 4 rods wide over the southern portion of the area 
involved and 100 feet wide over the northern portion. A 
small area in the north portion of Section 24 was not in-
cluded in these warranty deeds, but through that area the 
4-rod right of way has been claimed by the railroad com-
pany, has been fenced, has been assessed to the railroad 
company for tax purposes, and taxes paid thereon to the 
proper taxing authorities, including both the state of Utah 
and l\1:urray City since at least the year 1917. 
The record is absolutely void of any evidence of USE 
by any party whatsoever of any of the area as a roadway 
prior to the time patents were issued, and while the prop-
erty was still public domain. The recitals in ancient deeds 
are not competent or sufficient in and of themselves to 
prove the establishment or existence of the roadway and 
could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered 
as evidence of USE of any roadway while the property was 
still public domain. 
The evidence is competent and sufficient to show that 
a roadway by prescription has been acquired over the wes-
terly strip beginning 11 feet and more to the west of the 
track and extending on westerly and including, also, a pre-
scriptive right over the cross streets. This prescriptive 
use includes the right to maintain power pole lines down 
the westerly side (plus a few as exist on the east side). It 
includes a right to maintain an underground 4-inch culin-
ary water line down the west side and includes the right 
of surface travel over the described westerly strip by 
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pedestrians, wagons, carts, automobiles, and other modern 
surface traffic. The reasonable necessity and extent of this 
surface travel has been well defined by the oiled surface 
placed and maintained thereon by Murray City for well 
over twenty years past. 
The trial court correctly concluded and adjudged that 
the railroad company had the fee title to property described 
in paragraph 16 of the findings of fact, and his judgment 
thereon should be sustained and affirmed. 
The trial court erred in finding that the public used 
and acquired a right of way over the property described 
in finding of fact No. 9 while such property was still public 
domain. 
The evidence does not warrant nor justify any finding 
or judgment other than that the public has acquired pre-
scriptive rights in the property described in said paragraph 
9 of the findings of fact, including cross streets, and the 
judgment should be modified to so show, and the injunction 
as prayed for by plaintiffs should be granted unless the 
defendant Murray City secures a proper right of way or 
otherwise enters into a contract with plaintiffs with respect 
to the laying and maintaining of said sewer line as proposed 
and as being undertaken by said city. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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